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ABSTRACT
This paper is a reflection on the role of intellectuals in engaging with 
Palestinian solidarity movements and liberation discourses, and on 
the place of international lawyers specifically within that context. 
The paper considers ‘the question of Palestine’ as a rigorous test 
for intellectuals in the Global North today, and examines particular 
debates over free speech, civility and balance that unfolded in the 
wake of Israel’s 2014 war on Gaza. It considers the interventions of 
international lawyers in these debates with reference to Edward Said’s 
‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ intellectuals, and explores ways in which 
anti-colonial international lawyers (as amateur intellectuals) can 
transcend prevailing professional orthodoxies to deploy language, 
arguments or tactics that rupture liberal legal processes and narratives 
on Palestine.
Introduction
It is a spirit in opposition, rather than in accommodation, that grips me because the romance, 
the interest, the challenge of intellectual life is to be found in dissent against the status quo at 
a time when the struggle on behalf of underrepresented and disadvantaged groups seems so 
unfairly weighted against them. (Edward Said)1
The @IDFSpokesperson is a lying motherfucker. (Stephen Salaita)2
This paper is a reflection on the role of intellectuals in engaging with Palestinian solidarity 
movements and liberation discourses, and on the place of international lawyers specifically 
within that context. My point of departure is Edward Said’s Representations of the Intellectual, 
and the particular distinction Said draws between professional and amateur intellectuals 
(his twist on Gramsci’s traditional and organic intellectuals or, from a more explicitly Third 
World perspective, on Fanon’s colonial and native intellectuals). The paper considers ‘the 
question of Palestine’ as a rigorous test for intellectuals in the Global North today, and exam-
ines debates over free speech, political expression, academic freedom, civility and balance. 
It does so in the context of two particular ‘affairs’ that unfolded in the wake of Israel’s 2014 
war on Gaza, and that are indicative of broader restrictions on the intellectual space to cri-
tique such colonial violence. I present these examples as the Salaita affair (regarding Steven 
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Salaita’s loss of a tenured appointment at the university of Illinois over positions he expressed 
publicly during the Israeli bombardment), and the Schabas affair (regarding the campaign 
against William Schabas serving as chair of the uN Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza war).
The next section begins by elaborating Said’s framing of the amateur intellectual in rela-
tion to contemporary debates on Palestine. The following two sections then use the Salaita 
and Schabas affairs to deconstruct the figure of the professional, conformist intellectual. The 
prevailing conventionalism ensured that mainstream international lawyers (as professional 
intellectuals) for the most part maintained conservative positions during these affairs and 
deferred to the presumed legitimacy of Israel’s use of force. I interrogate and contest the 
paradigms of civility and balance that are imposed in this context. The fifth section moves 
to rehabilitate the partisan, subversive intellectual as a counterpoint. In doing so, I seek to 
build on Said’s conception of the amateur intellectual by instilling a particular sense of 
partisanship that draws on Walter Rodney’s notion of the ‘guerrilla intellectual’. Following 
on from this, the sixth section begins to think normatively and prescriptively against pre-
vailing professional orthodoxies, considering international law as a space of social move-
ments as well as of elite institutions. I explore some of the ways in which anti-colonial 
international lawyers (as amateur intellectuals) can deploy language, arguments or tactics 
that subvert or rupture liberal legal processes and narratives on Palestine, and that may 
allow us to think about Third World approaches to International law (TWaIl) as praxis.
Amateur intellectuals
Given that the badge of professionalism is something that most lawyers will wear with pride, it 
must be emphasised at the outset that Said uses the term pejoratively, to unveil the depoliticised 
expert figure whose professional intellectualism is self-serving and deferential to established, 
and establishment, structures. For Said himself, by contrast, it is a spirit of opposition rather than 
accommodation that grips him. While his homage to the ‘romance’ of intellectual life may connote 
a somewhat idealised self-representation of a critic who nonetheless had his own dalliance with 
the Plo hierarchy, his emphasis on dissent – against a status quo that is so unfairly weighted 
against subjugated groups – resonates today as sharply as ever in the Palestinian context. Israeli 
domination and segregation throughout historic Palestine continue to become both socially 
and legally more entrenched by the day, the colonisation of the West Bank carries on apace and 
the bombardments of Gaza become more brutal and ruthless in their mechanised violence. and 
while this hot violence of Israel’s periodic wars on Gaza dominates our news feeds at sporadic 
intervals, the slow, cold violence of the state’s legal armoury serves to entrench other particular 
forms of control in Israel and East Jerusalem.3
Where Said characterises the Dreyfus affair and the first world war as ‘rigorous tests for 
intellectuals’ in the early 20 century,4 the nature of Zionism and the situation in Palestine 
presents a comparably rigorous test for intellectuals in the early twenty-first century. It is by 
no means the only such test presented from that region of the world, but it remains arguably 
more significant than ever. The positions that we in the Global North take or fail to take on 
Israel/Palestine define our politics in relation to state power, to imperialism, to resistance, to 
the international donor industry. For Richard Falk, Palestine stands among the three pre-em-
inent issues for progressive emancipatory politics today. he places ‘support for the Palestinian 
Solidarity Movement, including its BDS campaign as…a creative form of resistance to oppres-
sive circumstances’ at the centre of the agenda, alongside the struggle against unjust and 
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unsustainable forms of globalised neoliberalism, and the need to urgently address the eco-
logical and existential threats of climate change.5 how we situate ourselves on Palestine is 
as revealing of our thinking as our positions on the commodification of social services or 
the destruction of the planet. Palestine functions very much as a frontier for imperialism and 
a testing-ground for its technologies of war. It functions equally, therefore, as a magnet and 
metaphor for anti-imperial analysis and activism.6
Said’s portrayals of the intellectual are universal in their outlook but very much shaped 
by his own positioning as a Palestinian intellectual in physical and metaphysical exile. as 
such, his description of the ‘public role of the intellectual’ as being one of perpetual ‘outsider, 
“amateur,” and disturber of the status quo’ is auto-biographical in many respects.7 Said’s 
amateur intellectual is defined by an ‘unquenchable interest in the larger picture, in making 
connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for 
ideas and values despite the restrictions of a profession’.8 he contrasts such pursuit of truth 
with ‘the insiders, experts, coteries, professionals’ and with conformists who fail to question 
corporate thinking, and class, racial or gender privilege, who fixate instead on ‘what is con-
sidered to be proper, professional behaviour – not rocking the boat, not straying outside 
the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, 
hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and “objective”’.9 Such professionalism is marked by 
an attitude that views scholarship as a nine-to-five pursuit in atomised spaces of niche 
research, in which the cult of the expert proliferates and intellectual work puts itself in the 
service of power. In a Western context Said saw this corruption of the role of the intellectual 
as bound up in depoliticisation, writing in 1988 that ‘among the left the use of the word 
intellectual has fallen into disrepute and disuse. and what instead has appeared are words 
like professional and scholar and academic … I think it’s partly because of the refusal of 
american left intellectuals to accept their political role.’10
The realm of public international law is heavily professionalised, institutionalised and 
depoliticised. Whether it is human rights or international criminal justice, world trade rules 
or foreign investment law, the mainstreams of these fields are populated by professional 
lawyers, academics and advocates who take pride in being part of projects that they see as 
progressive – advancing rights, combating impunity, facilitating commerce and enterprise. 
But when it comes to Israel/Palestine these fields are marked by a fundamentally conservative 
streak. The need to be seen as balanced and to hold both sides of the (uneven) conflict to 
account – as the international human rights organisations and uN fact-finding missions 
reporting on Palestine typically oblige themselves to do – obfuscates the structural dynamics 
of dispossession, exclusion and domination that have long been at play. It is notable that 
Said specifically cites the international lawyer, along with the military strategist, as exempli-
fying the type of professional intellectual who speaks and deals in a language that has 
become highly specialised but largely detached from the material realities over which it is 
layered. That specialised language masks the brutality of war and occupation, sanitises state 
violence and terror, barbarises resistance. There is perhaps something in the balancing and 
equivalencing tendencies of law and legal structures that feeds in to the attitudes of lawyers 
and helps explain why legal scholars have been particularly reactionary in their engagement 
on Palestine. Thus we hear the constant refrain of the empty phraseology of ‘both sides’, 
‘balance’ and ‘proportionality’; the internalising of Israel’s self-executing right to self-defence; 
and the incorporation of the insidious euphemisms of ‘collateral damage’, ‘surgical strikes’, 
‘moderate physical pressure’, ‘knocks on the roof’, and so on.
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The vocabulary of coloniser and colonised, on the other hand, is largely absent from the 
lexicon of professional international law when it comes to Palestine, while so many human 
rights lawyers (both in practice and the academy) are still unwilling to talk about Israeli 
apartheid or to engage with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement,11 for 
fear of a perceived loss of objectivity. at a time when Israel is ramping up its internal and 
external efforts to prohibit boycotts by law, when Western governments are signing agree-
ments with Israel that commit themselves to clamping down on BDS activities,12 and when 
uS legislators are seeking to use the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agree-
ment as a vehicle for that same end in Europe,13 challenging this orthodoxy remains essential. 
Principled action does not come without complication, however. Being an intellectual who 
pursues a ‘vocation for the art of representing…involves both commitment and risk’.14 a 
stated commitment to Palestinian liberation in much of the Western academy and institu-
tional political life bears risks of professional marginalisation as well as the stigma of being 
branded anti-semitic – as many who speak critically of Israeli state policy (including Jews 
and Jewish Israelis) regularly are, despite all available evidence and logic.
The Salaita affair
Some of the limitations that typify professional intellectual thinking can be seen in the 
debates over freedom of expression that followed the university of Illinois at urbana-
Champaign’s (uIuC) termination of the tenured appointment of a Palestinian-american 
scholar of Native american studies in 2014. Steven Salaita lost his job, essentially, over the 
positions he took publicly during Israel’s summer war on Gaza that year, primarily through 
the medium of Twitter. From the beginning of the Israeli bombing campaign in early July, 
Salaita was relatively prolific in his tweets on the situation as it evolved, covering a range of 
aspects including: updates on the number of children killed by Israeli forces in Gaza; criticism 
of uS support for Israel; mockery of what he characterised as the Zionist propensity to blame 
hamas for everything that is wrong throughout the world; emphasis on the importance of 
BDS as a tactical response to Israeli aggression; and gratitude for what he saw as growing 
solidarity with Palestinians from around the globe. Some of his posts were marked by a 
rawness, anger and language that are the product of watching atrocities, injustices and 
misrepresentations unfold in real time: ‘Fuck you, #Israel. and while I’m at it, fuck you, too, 
Pa, Sisi, arab monarchs, obama, uK, Eu, Canada, uS Senate, corporate media, and ISIS’.15
It was because of such utterances that Salaita’s contract was revoked, on grounds of 
‘incivility’. Significantly many of his tweets had engaged the very themes of civilisation and 
civility, in the context of race and colonialism:
I hope #Israel’s brutality in #Gaza compels people to think about the violence inherent to Western 
notions (and practices) of modernity.16
#Israel has often tested weapons in #Gaza. That’s what most colonizers do to entrapped native 
populations. They like to call it ‘progress.17
#Israel's bombardment of #Gaza provides a necessary impetus to reflect on the genocides that 
accompanied the formation of the united States.18
The technology of colonialism changes, but in every era the colonizer’s great advantage was 
restricting the geography of the native. #Gaza.19
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It is worth noting that such conceptually grounded statements outweigh the more visceral 
formulations in Salaita’s Twitter feed that were presented in complaints to uIuC as ‘vile’, 
‘vulgar’, or ‘anti-semitic’, and as evidence that Salaita would be better placed in a ‘loony bin’.20 
Salaita explains that he uses Twitter to ‘put forward a decolonial perspective that draws from 
certain influences, among them Indigenous thought, critical theory, and literary analysis. 
Most of my tweets distill decolonial theory into workaday language.’21 This, like Salaita’s 
expressions of gratitude for ‘our Jewish brothers and sisters around the world deploring 
#Israel’s brutality in #Gaza’,22 is not acknowledged in the reactionary complaints over his less 
‘civil’ critiques of that brutality. The broader point, however, is that characterisations of the 
incivility of a racialised voice in a settler-colonial state cannot be viewed in isolation from 
the historical and ongoing contexts of the ‘civilising mission’. The legitimacy of despotic rule 
over the ‘uncivilised’ barbarians, and the denial of liberties to them – for their own improve-
ment – is of course central to classic Millsian liberal imperial thought.23 Civility is bound up 
with exclusionary processes designed to construct barriers and keep the ruling classes in 
the ascendancy. John locke’s political subjects, for example, are defined by their Christianity, 
their respect for English law and property, and the ‘civility in their language’.24 This serves a 
very particular function in colonial projects, with civility of discourse and comport used as 
a marker of the level (or absence) of humanity and sovereignty in the colonised, and thus 
implicated in their conquest and extermination.
In a settler-colonial society such as the uSa, then, civility does not exist in a historical or 
ideological vacuum and does not operate as a neutral concept. It is a term with particular 
imperial and violent sensibilities; it is ‘the discourse of educated racism…the sanctimony of 
the authoritarian…the pretext of the oppressor’.25 It is not insignificant that Salaita’s schol-
arship is concerned with comparative settler-coloniality and that his position in Illinois was 
in an american Indian and Indigenous Studies department. his experience is symptomatic 
of a broader marginalisation of decolonial pedagogy in uS higher education, which extends 
from Native american to Palestine studies. In the use of the idiom of civility by university 
administrators engaged in such marginalisation, the echoes of coloniality are stark. In 
response, Salaita is unapologetic:
Insofar as ‘civil’ is profoundly racialized and has a long history of demanding conformity to the 
ethos of imperialism and colonization, I frequently choose incivility as a form of communication. 
(or it is chosen for me.) This choice is both moral and rhetorical. anybody familiar with age-old 
colonial discourses about the suitability of natives for self-governance understands that the lan-
guage of civilization is profoundly compromised. Those who decry my ‘incivility,’ then, implicate 
the cultures and histories from which my rhetoric and morality emerge.26
The very purpose of progressive politics is to disrupt accepted orders of power, and to recon-
stitute what is civil and desirable in society. This is what Palestine solidarity politics does. 
Conscious of this, invocations of ‘incivility’ are central to the work of pro-Israel groups in 
combatting Palestine solidarity organising. Support for Palestinian liberation is invariably 
dismissed as uncivil, regardless of how respectfully it is articulated. In the face of remorseless 
state violence against a besieged population, it would appear that Salaita (understandably) 
prioritises moral clarity over meek platitudes of civility, and language that cuts through the 
imposed constraints of balance to unmask the gravity of atrocity: ‘after all, there is nothing 
civil about dead children in an ice cream freezer’.27 Through his ‘incivility manifesto’, Salaita 
embraces the charge of incivility as the amateur intellectual’s modus operandi – that of 
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opposition to militarism and institutional discrimination, antagonism towards the commer-
cialisation of the academy and agitation to democratise academic spaces.
For Joan Scott, who served as chair of the american association of university Professors’ 
Committee on academic Freedom and Tenure from 1999 to 2005, civility is now ‘a synonym 
for orthodoxy’, a framing for the contempt for unorthodox ideas or behaviour which – with 
its distinctly European Christian bourgeois heritage – ‘has become a watch word for academic 
administrators’.28 Thus it was that Phyllis Wise, the Chancellor of uIuC who oversaw Salaita’s 
dismissal, justified the decision on grounds that tenure ‘brings with it a heavy responsibility 
to continue the traditions of scholarship and civility upon which our university is built’.29 The 
utility of civility as a silencing mechanism is clear, and in this sense it functions in a similar 
manner to the charge of anti-semitism when it is spuriously invoked to muffle criticism of 
Israeli state practice.30 We can also discern here the type of ‘background repression’ that 
preconditions societal norms and mindsets, vitiates objectivity and renders critical voices 
unacceptable, even where there are no formal restrictions on academic freedom.31 Judith 
Butler explains that the conservative seizure of academic freedom in the uSa has emphasised 
an orthodoxy of ‘balance’ – with the consequence that state legislatures are empowered to 
enforce this balance, necessitating surveillance and interference. academic freedom as such 
is ‘restrictively liberal’; ‘if the conservative seizure of academic freedom is to fail, there must 
be more robust and substantive ways to relate academic freedom to ideals of democracy 
that include not only right of free expression but opposition to forms of surveillance that 
target political viewpoints’.32
In this context it seems clear that there are particular political viewpoints that are targeted. 
uIuC itself provides a number of recent examples that highlight the selectivity of Salaita’s 
punishment: ‘Tellingly, in 2012, uIuC took no action when a professor made racist comments 
at a gathering of white supremacists, and in 2010, uIuC reinstated a lecturer who had been 
terminated for making homophobic comments in an email to a student’.33 and just six 
months before she presided over Salaita’s sacking for his tweets, Chancellor Wise had herself 
been subjected to a torrent of misogynistic and racist invective by students using a 
‘#FuckPhyliss’ hashtag on Twitter, after she decided not to cancel classes during extreme 
weather. Despite the vitriolic nature of the tweets, Wise refused to discipline the students, 
stating: ‘The negative comments, as offensive as they were, are protected speech’.34 This 
appears as the tolerance of an authority fully convinced by the sanctity and robustness of 
its own liberalism, in much the same way that decisions permitting neo-Nazis to parade 
through a predominantly Jewish suburb (home to many holocaust survivors),35 or allowing 
homophobes to picket military funerals, are held up as evidence of the unshakeable american 
commitment to free speech.36 These liberal values come undone, however, when it comes 
to criticism of Israel, such that the Center for Constitutional Rights now speaks of the ‘Palestine 
exception’ to free speech in the uSa.37
as such, the Salaita affair raises important questions of political speech, freedom of expres-
sion and modes of engagement for public intellectuals, for whom media such as Twitter 
have become important sites of intervention and intellectual production. The apparently 
successful interference of private donors with the staff profile of a public university in this 
case is a chilling turn. While the Committee on academic Freedom and Tenure that reviewed 
the case – in response to a complaint by the Department of american Indian Studies against 
the decision of the university’s Chancellor and Board of Trustees – found that the supposed 
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‘incivility’ of a candidate’s utterances were not acceptable grounds for the termination of 
her contract, the spectre of professionalism instead surfaces as an alternative justification:
extramural utterances – political speech – ‘rarely bear upon a faculty member’s fitness for office’. 
The Chancellor elided the distinction between the two. They should be disaggregated. We do 
not believe that Dr Salaita’s political speech renders him unfit for office. Further, we find that 
civility does not constitute a legitimate criterion for rejecting his appointment…We do believe, 
however, that the Chancellor has raised a legitimate question of whether his professional fitness 
adheres to professional standards.38
The question then arises as to how such professional standards are defined or interpreted. 
one of Salaita’s own tweets, just days before his firing, was somewhat prescient in this regard: 
‘In the united States, academic, corporate, or political respectability is available merely by 
ignoring Israeli ethnic cleansing. #Gaza.’39 university of Illinois emails relating to the Salaita 
affair that were released under a court order in august 2015 provide a telling insight into 
the thinking of university management on this question of what constitutes professional 
fitness, standards and values:
a related policy might address the question of ‘controversial’ hires – this is murkier, because peo-
ple’s ideas of what is controversial will differ. But a crude rule of thumb is, if you think someone’s 
name is going to end up on the front page of the newspaper as a u of I employee, you can’t make 
that decision on your own say so. you need to get some higher level review and approval…We 
welcome the widest possible range of viewpoints and positions, but not all positions. and that 
[sic] there are some things that are not consistent with our values.40
The university, as the state’s public university, needs to, in many ways, reflect the values of the 
state. 41
This resembles Said’s very definition of the professional intellectual – the duty of an academic 
intellectual is to conform to the official position; in essence, ‘at the university of Illinois at 
urbana-Champaign, academic freedom is the freedom to pursue the widest possible range 
of viewpoints and positions, except for those that are not consistent with our values, which 
must reflect the values of the state’.42 The particular invocation of professionalism in this case 
finds echoes in the firing of angela Davis from the university of California, los angeles. That 
university’s board of regents had ordered the firing of Davis in 1969 on the basis of her 
Communist Party membership, but a California Superior Court overturned this. Governor 
Ronald Reagan continued his crusade to fire Davis, and successfully obtained a decision 
from the board of regents to do so in 1970, which he said was based ‘on her unprofessional 
conduct as shown by speaking around various campuses already troubled by dissension’.43 
her conduct was unprofessional and her rhetoric (in speeches made off-campus) was uncivil 
– ‘inflammatory’.44 Davis was resolute in her (amateur intellectualist) tirade against institu-
tionalised racism and sexism: ‘When people start saying that we are out to subvert, that we 
are subversive, we should say hell yes, we are subversive. hell yes, and we’re going to con-
tinue to be subversive until we have subverted this whole damn system of oppression’.45
More than 40 years later, in railing against the dogma of civility, Salaita is conscious of 
‘how something that sounds so innocuous, even desirable, is in fact repressive’.46 In interna-
tional law, in many ways, it has been ever thus. The language of ‘civilisation’ was deployed 
through foundational international legal doctrines and texts to exclude indigenous and 
Third World peoples from sovereignty, to rationalise the coloniality of the league of Nations 
mandates, and to retain a superior standing for ‘civilised nations’ in the united Nations era, 
through article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. For much of 
international law’s history, and to this day, the civilised/uncivilised binary has been a central 
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narrative feature. We can look at one international lawyer’s intervention in the Salaita debate 
as illustrative of a broader mindset within the discipline. Dov Jacobs is a legal academic, 
practitioner and self-described ‘expert blogger’ on issues of international criminal law and 
human rights.47 In July–august of 2014, while the situation in Gaza was raising numerous 
questions around the laws of armed conflict and the possible jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, and while fellow international criminal law bloggers were intensively debat-
ing the situation, Jacobs stayed silent on his blog. When he did choose to intervene on events 
relating to Gaza, it was with a piece not on the war itself but on the Salaita affair, challenging 
the idea that any principles of academic freedom of expression were at stake in Salaita’s 
case.48 Viewed through the lens of Palestine as a litmus test of sorts for intellectuals, the 
politics of this are not insignificant. Jacobs took particular issue with the tweet in which 
Salaita referred to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) spokesperson as a ‘lying motherfucker’. a 
statement like this, Jacobs said, cannot stem from any academic thinking; it is just a crude 
insult. Jacobs contrasted this to his own approach, whereby he ‘always provides detailed 
reasoning’ for any ‘strong feelings’ he might have on the tribunals, prosecutors or judges in 
The hague. If he were to use a profanity to describe the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, he would not see it as unjustified for his employers to fire him.49
Part of the problem with Jacobs’ response is that his discussion of Salaita’s tweet as ‘gen-
erally insulting’ and ‘simply being very rude’ (which itself, as I have noted above, is not fully 
representative of the larger collection of Salaita’s tweets) is based on a de-contextualised 
and apolitical understanding of the term ‘motherfucker’. This is a professional intellectual 
perception which elides the distinct social and historical trajectories of the word in the uSa 
as it emerged from the slave plantations, was carried on though jazz culture, given a revi-
talised political content by black power movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and continues 
to enjoy widespread and often politicised usage in contemporary hip-hop culture. as Michael 
Kearney points out, Salaita, as a person of colour in the uSa, is situated firmly in this tradition 
of minority dissent and resistance.50 and as a postcolonial scholar of Palestinian origin, Salaita 
is doubtless well-versed in Said’s contention that: ‘Knowing how to use language well and 
knowing when to intervene in language are two essential features of intellectual action’. 51 
Salaita could have chosen any number of words to describe the IDF spokesperson, but he 
chose a term that has a particular identification with opposition to establishment racism or 
violence and is widely understood in that context: at least for certain communities but 
‘perhaps not for white academics’.52 as Earl Washington explains:
The white majority culture tends to put what the black minority culture says into its own (white) 
frame of reference. Consequently, whites would define ‘motherfucker’ as a very negative and 
slang term – literally incest. That definition, however, is only one intended by those who use 
the word.53
Calling the Israeli army spokesperson a lying motherfucker should be understood not as a 
mindless insult, but as a challenge to the political language used to defend the massacre of 
Palestinians and as an assertion of the falsehood upon which that defence rests. Political 
language deployed by the state apparatus is, of course, often an exercise in defending the 
indefensible, ‘designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable’.54 This essentially 
is one of the functions of the military spokesperson when Israeli forces engage in the bom-
bardment of Gaza. The objection of the professional intellectual in this case, however, appears 
to be based on the perception of personalised insult, rather than on the allegation of insti-
tutional dishonesty. The effect of such an objection is to deflect from the underlying issue 
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of an atrocity being perpetrated. The appearance of reasonableness and civility becomes 
more important than truth itself; the concern is with the ‘motherfucker’, not the ‘lying’. It is 
this aspect of professionalism – deflection rather than reflection – that we must vigorously 
contest. C. Wright Mills reminds us of the imperative of heeding the intimate relationship 
between personal morals, intellect and political stand: ‘If the thinker does not relate himself 
to the value of truth in political struggle, he cannot responsibly cope with the whole of live 
experience’.55 Resistance to official narratives is essential to smashing the stereotypes with 
which we are swamped. For Said this necessitates ‘unmaskings or alternative versions in 
which to the best of one’s ability the intellectual tries to tell the truth’.56
Since the 2014 war on Gaza we have seen powerful usages of the term ‘motherfucker’ 
continuing in public discourse in other situations of structural and racial injustice, most 
notably in the context of racist police violence in the uSa. after the announcement of the 
grand jury decision not to indict the police officer who killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, the atlanta hip-hop artist and social activist Killer Mike made an eloquent and 
impassioned speech, telling the agents of power that ‘you motherfuckers got me today, but 
you motherfuckers will not own tomorrow’, and telling his audience that ‘it’s about poverty, 
it’s about greed, and it’s about a war machine…the one thing I want you to know is that it’s 
us against the motherfucking machine’.57 Similarly, in a globalisation context, Third World 
resistance to Western-dominated financial institutions is epitomised in Seun Kuti’s charac-
terisation of the IMF as ‘international motherfuckers’. The critical awareness among oppressed 
communities of the role of law and institutional structures in their oppression is crucial here 
if local resistance and global solidarity is to be able to take root and shape alternative hori-
zons – whether for Palestinians, black communities in the uSa or subjugated groups else-
where. The organic intellectuals in the Black lives Matter movement are very much aware 
of this; hence the significance of their visit to Palestine in January 2015 and the ongoing 
deepening of Black–Palestinian solidarity.58 This echoes the ethos of previous generations 
of african american intellectuals, who saw themselves ‘become a Palestinian’,59 or the thrust 
of a Black Panther party that situated itself in ‘radical kinship’ with the Palestinians.60 Freedom 
remains a constant struggle in Ferguson and Palestine alike,61 where communities continue 
to be confronted with the physical machine of militarised violence. Intellectuals who chal-
lenge the security state justifications for such, meanwhile, are susceptible to different forms 
of silencing in their own fields.
The Schabas affair
William Schabas was met by such attempts at silencing upon his appointment as chair of 
the uN Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Schabas, like Richard 
Goldstone before him, would not be considered a radical by any means. he is seen, rather, 
as an international lawyer with ‘perfect professional credentials…a distinguished and justly 
influential scholar in the field’,62 a progressive but mainstream authority on international 
human rights law and international criminal law. as such, he might have been assumed a 
relatively uncontroversial choice for a uN post charged with investigation and documenta-
tion of international legal questions in Gaza in comparison to a more critical legal scholar 
like Richard Falk, whose appointment in 2008 as uN Special Rapporteur on human rights in 
occupied Palestine incensed Israel and its supporters. Despite this, Schabas faced vehement 
opposition from the outset. Denunciation from Israel’s apologists in uN advocacy circles 
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(such as hillel Neuer and Gerald Steinberg) and in legal academia (alan Dershowitz and oren 
Gross) is perhaps par for the course. But some observers may not have expected to find 
liberal international lawyers – like Phillipe Sands and Robert howse – collectively pontificat-
ing online about Schabas’s purported bias, and the need instead for impartiality and ‘the 
highest standards of judicial integrity’.63 These demands that judicial standards be applied, 
it must be noted, are made in the context of a fact-finding process with no judicial mandate. 
Some international lawyers went as far as to argue that the specific criteria applied to judges 
under the Code of Ethics of the International Criminal Court should be applied to Schabas, 
in a manner that constructs an indefensible lack of impartiality on his part.64 Such expecta-
tions are far removed from the human and material realities of people living through conflict 
and occupation, but are indicative of the type of thinking that is coloured by a perennial 
need for artificial balance and ostensible professionalism.
as a result of pressure on the uN process from a broad church of pro-Israel campaign 
groups, think-tanks, political actors and professional intellectuals that threatened to derail 
the Commission of Inquiry’s work, Schabas was ultimately left with little choice but to resign. 
The primary impetus for the campaign against him was based on a public statement he had 
made previously (but which was recycled and presented out of context) criticising Israeli 
military practices and suggesting that Prime Minister Netanyahu may have a case to answer, 
as well as a legal opinion he had provided to the Plo (regarding technical aspects of acces-
sion to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). although his was not a judicial 
appointment, supposed standards of judicial independence were applied – liberally con-
structed not as independence and impartiality in conducting the inquiry itself (which 
Schabas had fully committed himself to exercising), but as retroactive independence of any 
opinion on any question relating to the region being investigated. It bears noting that such 
high thresholds have not traditionally been applied even to international judges themselves. 
hersch lauterpacht, who had furnished legal advice to the state of Israel over the years and 
had helped draft its declaration of independence, sat as a judge in the Israel v. Bulgaria case 
in the International Court of Justice. Israel’s application was ultimately declared inadmissible 
in that case, but not without lauterpacht dissenting.
In Schabas’ case, however, because he had expressed opinions on Palestine in the past, 
he was not deemed an appropriate choice to lead an inquiry on Palestine. This is reflective 
of an emerging pattern when it comes to international institutional appointments on con-
tested terrain such as this, where relevant experience and prior expressions of opinion or 
interest can count against an applicant or nominee. Regarding the choice of his own suc-
cessor as uN Special Rapporteur, Falk points out that Makarim Wibisono ‘was explicitly chosen 
in 2014 to be Special Rapporteur for Palestine on the perverse rationale that he was more 
qualified than other candidates because he had no expert knowledge of the subject-matter’.65 
Professional human rights intellectuals and international criminal lawyers are expected not 
to care about Greece or Syria in 2016 any more than they cared about yugolsavia or Somalia 
in 1993. There is a professional stigma attached to being overly ‘passionate’ about a particular 
issue or conflict. International legal historians or researchers who identify with a cause are 
rebuked on the basis that their work ‘fails to provide objectivity’.66 herbert Marcuse warns 
of the pitfalls of such fetishisation of nominal objectivity: ‘in a democracy with totalitarian 
organization, objectivity may…foster a mental attitude which tends to obliterate the differ-
ence between true and false, information and indoctrination, right and wrong’.
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The result is a neutralization of opposites, a neutralization, however, which takes place on the 
firm grounds of the structural limitation of tolerance and within a preformed mentality. When 
a magazine prints side by side a negative and a positive report on the FBI, it fulfills honestly the 
requirements of objectivity: however, the chances are that the positive wins because the image 
of the institution is deeply engraved in the mind of the people. or, if a newscaster reports the 
torture and murder of civil rights workers in the same unemotional tone he uses to describe the 
stockmarket or the weather, or with the same great emotion with which he says his commercials, 
then such objectivity is spurious – more, it offends against humanity and truth by being calm 
where one should be enraged, by refraining from accusation where accusation is in the facts 
themselves. The tolerance expressed in such impartiality serves to minimize or even absolve 
prevailing intolerance and suppression.67
Said himself recounts how he ‘was accused of being active in the battle for Palestinian rights, 
and thus disqualified for any sober or respectable platform at all’. In contrast to so-called 
‘universal intellectuals’ such as Jean-Paul Sartre or Michel Foucault, those who have been 
personally involved in any way with a specific cause are cast as biased. For Said, such asper-
sions amount to ‘plainly anti-intellectual and antirational arguments’.68 hamid Dabashi picks 
up on this distinction: ‘Sartre and Foucault cared widely about the entirety of the colonial 
and colonizing world, while Fanon and Said cared deeply about algeria and Palestine, and 
from these two sites of contestation they extrapolated their politics and ethics of responsi-
bility towards the rest of the world’.69 While Fanon’s commitment to algeria was on the basis 
of a broader anti-colonial sensibility rather than national identity, and while Sartre and 
Foucault certainly did not refrain from taking positions on specific sites of contestation, there 
is something to the suggestion that the European intellectual’s engagement is often seen 
in the West as less ‘emotive’ than that of the Third World intellectual. The subtext of raciali-
sation is difficult to escape. Indigenous and minority communities in settler-colonial societies 
are similarly often cast as irrational, to the point that their language may be criminalised on 
the basis of state claims of violence, whether in the context of anti-segregation activism 
during the Jim Crow era or hip-hop lyricism today.70 For Palestinians, african-americans and 
other racialised voices to be seen as professional, they need to appear as devoid of race 
politics as possible. Such distortions of the ‘all lives matter’ variety must be exposed and 
discredited.
International institutional life is not simply a world of insiders and professionals but one 
of conformists. While there clearly are questions of race at play, when it comes to Palestine 
it is not only a question of race. Even insiders like Schabas and Goldstone, if they make the 
mistake of straying beyond the circle or opting not to conform by engaging in ‘politicised’ 
processes, will be cast out for behaving in ‘unwise and counterproductive’ manners that 
compromise hegemonic conceptions of justice.71 Such deviations are framed as individual 
aberrations (and, for those of Jewish origin, as evidence of ‘self-hating’ character flaws) and 
as such are qualitatively different from the constructed cultural deficiencies that exclude 
Palestinians en masse from the ambit of professional credibility. Both forms must be chal-
lenged robustly, however. Said is again instructive here, underlining the importance of the 
intellectual’s role in the ‘sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made 
cliches, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating confirmations of what the powerful or con-
ventional have to say, and what they do. Not just passively unwillingly [sic], but actively 
willing to say so in public.’72
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Partisanship and the guerrilla intellectual
For all of the value that Said’s thinking on the representations and affiliations of the intel-
lectual brings in unpacking the dynamics of institutionalised power and opening up spaces 
of dissent and disruption, his amateur intellectual nonetheless appears at times a somewhat 
idealised and elite figure. This section thus seeks to home in on a particular sense of parti-
sanship or militancy, so as to distinguish from the kind of liberal advocates who may have 
similarly romantic ideas of themselves speaking on behalf of the disadvantaged as those 
which Said ascribes to his truth-seeking intellectual. It also seeks to stretch Said’s sometimes 
narrow conceptualisation of the intellectual as the university intellectual, and to extend his 
analysis to non-campus spaces.
an academy-centric theory of the intellectual risks side-lining the knowledge production 
of movement activists and the representative function of working class organic intellectuals, 
as well as obscuring portraits of the artist as intellectual. against Said’s privileging of the 
writer-intellectual over the artist-intellectual (painters, film-makers, photographers, hip-hop 
lyricists, folk troubadours) or the social movement intellectual (political leaders, union activ-
ists, grassroots campaigners), Sean Scalmer argues that a ‘contemporary sociology of intel-
lectuals needs to encompass diversity’.73 This is essential to reflect the reality that so many 
of those who ‘represent’ as socio-political thinkers diverge in expectation, context and pri-
orities from the carefully sculpted image of the book-writing intellectual. This is significant 
in the context of our discussion of hip-hop above, for instance. how might Said have related 
to the street culture representations of Black lives Matter? on one hand, as Scalmer notes, 
Said’s narrow depiction of the intellectual to the exclusion of musical artists, in particular, is 
surprising given his ‘musicological passions’. on the other hand, his own aesthetic sensibilities 
may have meant that the protest missions of hip-hop or folk music were ‘not to Said’s for-
biddingly classical tastes’.74 This sense of a certain aloofness or elitism also speaks to Said’s 
lack of emphasis on ‘activist wisdom’ (‘practically oriented and contextually bound…painfully 
acquired and artfully deployed’) in his vision of intellectual achievement.75
To build on and bolster Said’s idea of the virtuous amateur intellectual, then, we can inject 
it with a more active sense of partisanship and draw on Walter Rodney’s notion of the ‘guer-
rilla intellectual’. During his time at the Institute of the Black World in the uSa in 1974, Rodney 
spoke of the ‘intellectual struggle’ within (and against) an institutional architecture that 
represents the power of the ruling class.
I use the term ‘guerrilla intellectual’ to come to grips with the initial imbalance of power in the 
context of academic learning…the books, the references, the theoretical assumptions, and the 
entire ideological underpinnings of what we have to learn in every single discipline. once you 
understand the power that all this represents, then you have to recognize that your struggle must 
be based on an honest awareness of the initial disparity. and that’s how the guerrilla operates. 
The guerrilla starts out by saying, the enemy has all and we have nothing in terms of weapons, 
but we have a lot of other things.76
It is in response to such pre-existing imbalances of power that Marcuse calls for pursuit of 
‘a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notice and practice’ as a counterpoint to the 
entrenched aversion to partisanship in liberal work.77 The imperative is to transcend the 
limitations of liberal freedoms and tolerance, given that their value is premised on an equality 
that is typically illusory. Where institutionalised inequality, class structures, socio-political 
privilege and legalised state violence predominate, the conditions of tolerance are inherently 
loaded. Critical or dissenting speech is subject to background limitations that precede the 
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explicit limitations on speech defined by courts and institutions. The freedom of expression 
that is formally granted in equal measures to all protagonists – whether they advocate hate 
or humanity – is a form of ‘non-partisan tolerance’ that is ‘“abstract” or “pure” inasmuch as it 
refrains from taking sides – but in doing so it actually protects the already established 
machinery of discrimination’.78 as such, there is no neutral position, even in the ‘freest’ of 
existing societies. Struggles for freedom are always partisan – intolerant of the repressive 
establishment and antagonistic to societal structures in which the game is rigged.
hence Rodney’s articulation of the guerrilla intellectual, whose mission is to sabotage 
the power disparity. Jean Genet saw his support for and engagement with the Palestinian 
liberation movement (as well as the Black Panthers) as a similar enactment of ‘the intellectual 
as guerrilla’. Genet was, at the same time, careful to emphasise the distinctly anti-colonial 
contours and qualifications of his partisanship: ‘The day the Palestinians become a nation 
like any other nation, I’ll no longer be a part of it’.79 Rodney’s argument also speaks clearly 
to Global North–South dynamics, where his metaphor of guerrilla tactics finds echo in 
Georges abi-Saab’s reflection of ‘operating behind enemy lines’ as a Third World jurist in 
Western-dominated international legal institutions.80 Given the inequality of arms in these 
contexts and beyond, for Rodney the task of the guerrilla is to wage a struggle on her own 
terms, not by confronting the dominant power directly but by occupying the terrain, entering 
the institutions and setting free the entire structure.81
With this in mind, the ‘major and first responsibility of the intellectual is to struggle over 
ideas…in his own sphere of operation’.82 For many intellectuals this is the sphere of the 
academy, and requires transformation of their own academic institutions. The Salaita affair 
reinforces this imperative. The burdens of professionalism and civility arguably weigh more 
heavily on the university intellectual because of her position in an institutional context. a 
broader conceptualisation of the intellectual’s role challenges the university intellectual to 
discard those burdens and get her hands dirtier but, as we have seen at uIuC and beyond, 
this is dis-incentivised by the very nature of the system in which the university intellectual 
operates. as such, the first point of engagement for the university intellectual is her own 
sphere of operation. But Rodney’s struggle over ideas also entails engaging beyond the 
university and transcending the distinctions between different forms of labour. The task of 
intellectuals and educators is that of ‘relating ideas to the movement of the masses’, both 
by ‘expropriating bourgeois knowledge’ and by cultivating alternative and subversive sites 
of knowledge production.83 Rodney’s own life and praxis very much straddled academic, 
activist and community spaces: ‘Walter did not confine his activities to the cloisters and 
lecture rooms at the university, but shared his knowledge and exchanged ideas with the 
most despised and rejected elements of Jamaican society – the Rastafari brethren’.84 In this 
sense he embodies the role of the institutionally embedded but liminal and oppositional 
scholar, oriented to the South and struggling against (Northern) hegemonic thought, insti-
tutions and learning. Rodney’s life and work embodied a richness of intersecting contribu-
tions from his multiple standpoints as Marxist and Pan-africanist, university academic and 
community educator, social critic and political activist. The synthesis of these various ways 
of being – as enacted across continents – and Rodney’s insights on the dynamics of black 
and Third World political and social development, are of continued value in thinking about 
praxis of the South. Rodney’s admiration for figures like ClR James and lenin is based on 
their capacity for intellectualising and doing at the same time; ‘for surely there was no real 
reason why one should remain in the academic world – that is, remain an intellectual – and 
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at the same time not be revolutionary’.85 This vista of praxis helps us to incorporate some of 
the practical and tactical aspects of activism into Said’s framing of the amateur 
intellectual.
Amateur international lawyers?
International law is a space of elite institutions but also a space of social movements. one 
of the significant contributions of TWaIl scholarship has been to show the possibilities (and 
importance) of reshaping the field of international law from outside or below, and of imag-
ining counter-hegemonic international law at least coexisting with and destabilising imperial 
international law,86 even if unable to supplant it in the present conjuncture. International 
legal advocacy from and for Palestine has traditionally deployed quite orthodox legal argu-
ments grounded primarily in international humanitarian law. It has tended for the most part 
to focus on the need for better institutional enforcement of international law, rather than 
highlighting law’s role in structural oppression. In recent years, however, Palestinian grass-
roots activism and international solidarity campaigns have begun to use international law, 
through the BDS movement and other initiatives, in more expansive ways than professional 
international lawyers and institutions themselves are comfortable with. The task as I see it 
for anti-colonial or Third Worldist international lawyers (as amateur intellectuals) in thinking 
about a type of TWaIl praxis in this context is to support and serve such movements where 
possible and appropriate (with technical contributions), as well as to go beyond the language 
of law and to continue exposing the biases and blindnesses of the profession (with concep-
tual contributions and critiques) where necessary.
one crucial role of the intellectual, Said argues, is to dismantle the restrictions that we 
artificially construct and impose on our thinking and communication. he notes, by way of 
example, that ‘the international lawyer speaks and deals in a language that has become 
specialized and usable by other members of the same field, specialized experts addressing 
other specialized experts in a lingua franca largely unintelligible to unspecialized people’.87 
as I have emphasised above, this specialised language that international lawyers speak often 
serves to obscure the violence of war and occupation and the asymmetries of power rela-
tions, or to mask the usurping of popular sovereignty by corporatist ideology. Demystifying 
the impenetrable language of international trade and investment treaties; problematising 
the reductive assumptions and classifications of international humanitarian law; challenging 
and transcending the prevailing orthodoxies in the discourse and landscape of international 
law; deploying legal language, arguments or tactics with a distinct anti-colonial bent: these 
can be the contributions of the international lawyer-as-intellectual that offer potential anti-
dotes to outright disenchantment with the law.
attempts to pursue such antidotes in the Palestinian context may be roughly grouped 
into three categories. I present these as illustrative of some of the tactics being employed, 
and do not intend to suggest that what follows is an exhaustive exegesis of the work being 
done. First, legal processes relating to Palestine can be subverted by activists invoking the 
prevention of war crimes as their defence against charges of interfering with the property 
of weapons manufacturers or settlement produce retailers,88 by legal representation of the 
boycott campaigns of unions, associations and solidarity movements who are targeted by 
Zionism’s own reactionary lawfare,89 or by the utilisation of quintessentially liberal legal 
institutions to articulate more radical anti-colonial arguments. Much of this work is essentially 
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about ‘being political lawyers and using the appropriate doctrinal hooks as they become 
available’.90 here, advocates for justice for Palestine can take further insights from the work 
of Jacques Vergès, Third Worldist and internationalist legal practitioner, whose rupture 
defences went some way to exposing and exploiting the contradictions inbuilt in the French 
colonial state’s use of criminal law against algerian liberation fighters. Notably it has been 
said of Vergès that in the professional sense, ‘his tactics are anything but lawyerly, but they’ve 
succeeded again and again [and] undoubtedly wreak havoc on hyprocrisy’.91
Both Steven Salaita’s case and the ‘Southampton affair’ (regarding the cancellation of an 
international law conference on Israel by university of Southampton management in april 
2015 on dubious ‘security’ grounds) ended up engaging professional sites of law in the form 
of domestic courts, with somewhat diverging implications for the notion of academic free-
dom. In august 2015 a united States District Court in Illinois held that Salaita did have a valid 
case to be answered for breach of contract and violation of his constitutional free speech 
rights. In November 2015 uIuC settled with Salaita to avoid proceeding to trial, and agreed 
to pay him damages to the tune of 10 years of his contracted salary. While this amounted 
to a formal acknowledgment that Salaita had been wronged, he was not reinstated. The 
‘decimation of the american Indian Studies Program at uIuC [as] an additional price tag paid 
by the university’s capitulation to internal and external forces’ is the lingering legacy.92 The 
litigation had secondary impacts in the form of the resignation of Phyllis Wise as uIuC 
Chancellor (albeit with the cushion of a $400,000 severance payment and a $300,000 faculty 
position) and the court-ordered release of university correspondence that exposed man-
agement practice. overall it may be seen as at least a partially successful outcome in terms 
of protecting free expression rights on Palestine, and as illustrative of the benefits of engag-
ing professional legal institutions in certain circumstances. The English high Court’s endorse-
ment of the cancellation of the Southampton conference, by contrast, demonstrates the 
limitations involved in accessing such conservative spaces.
Second is the move of opening up what we might call alternative ‘amateur’ arenas of 
political–legal struggle beyond the courts and the professional institutions. Civil society-led 
‘people’s tribunals’ have come to occupy an important space in international affairs in filling 
certain vacuums left by formal international legal institutions and providing what Falk calls 
a ‘jurisprudence of conscience’.93 The Russell Tribunal on Palestine can be understood as a 
kind of amateur international law process which confronts questions that the professional 
legal institutions in Geneva and The hague shirk – the arms trade with Israel, European union 
complicity in Palestinian suffering, Israel’s citizenship, nationality and residency laws as con-
stitutive of apartheid, and corporate profiteering in conjunction with military occupation. 
The Russell Tribunal has displayed a reach beyond its own proceedings and findings, its 
multifaceted identity seeing, for example, one jury member (Michael Mansfield) advocating 
before a uN committee in Geneva one week, another (Roger Waters) discussing Palestinian 
rights in Rolling Stone magazine the next. Notably, following the findings of the 2011 Russell 
Tribunal Cape Town session on the apartheid nature of Israeli legal systems and concerted 
research and activism on the issue by Palestinian social movements and international lawyers, 
in 2012 the uN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was pushed along 
the unprecedented path of censuring Israel under the rubric of apartheid and segregation.94 
This evokes the idea of international legal jurisprudence emanating from below. The special 
session of the Russell Tribunal convened in the wake of Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza was 
notable for the urgency and efficiency with which it was convened, while so many 
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international institutions dallied, and for going beyond the standard war crimes analysis to 
tackle difficult questions around the proliferation of racist discourse and incitement to vio-
lence in Israeli public and political life.95 The hessel Tribunal, a localised version of the Russell 
Tribunal (named after French second-world war partisan and patron of the Russell Tribunal 
on Palestine, Stéphane hessel) hosted by the grassroots Bil’in Popular Committee against 
the Wall and Settlements in 2013, is another striking demonstration of social movement 
usage of international law.
While aimed at fundamentally reshaping international law from below, TWaIl scholarship 
has, however, also shown how this transformative project has been unsuccessful for the 
most part. The mimicking of classic courtroom structures in these popular tribunal interven-
tions is certainly not without its limitations but at least does hold some value in exposing 
the structural imbalances in the coloniser/colonised relationship. While it may not be imme-
diately and quantifiably ‘effective’ in the professional legal sense of delivering a binding and 
enforceable judgment, the very idea of this type of guerrilla tactic matters – as a disruption 
of official processes and narratives, as an intervention in the ongoing ideational ‘legitimacy 
war’ playing out over Palestine/Israel,96 and as a bridge to activism happening outside of 
legal spaces.
Third, and most importantly perhaps, it is vital for international lawyers to feed into 
broader political mobilisation and solidarity movements, and for legal actions and BDS activ-
ism to complement and reinforce one another. International lawyers are well-placed to sup-
port the important work of Palestinian social movements and global solidarity campaigns 
through, for instance, continued research and analysis of the apartheid features of Israel’s 
population control regime, on the legal intricacies and impacts of settlement colonies, on 
the nefarious role played by corporate actors that aid and abet Israeli policy, and on any 
other forms of legal intervention that feed into concrete substantiations of BDS. While the 
demands of the Palestinian BDS call stem from the language and normative claims of inter-
national law, and cannot completely avoid the baggage that this entails, BDS nonetheless 
provides a blueprint for using international law without being overly hamstrung by the law’s 
internal contradictions and biases.
It is worth contrasting the BDS campaign, as an amateur or organic intellectual movement 
for Palestinian liberation, with the professional articulation of the Plo’s quest for statehood 
and uN membership. Whereas the statehood initiative collapses the larger Palestinian 
self-determination claim into one limited element, and has at times reduced the liberation 
struggle into a question of who to lobby on the Security Council, BDS has provided a mode 
of praxis for people around the world to respond – in many different and expansive and 
creative ways – to the call to express material solidarity with Palestine. This is slowly but very 
surely bearing fruit,97 and in this sense the amateur grassroots tactic is proving more suc-
cessful than the elite professional one. The other key point to emphasise here is that of a 
given tactic being not only about the concrete result that it achieves in the short term but 
the platform it lays for the longer-term strategic horizon, and the ways in which organising 
now shapes the conditions that materialise later. If we think about what the Palestinian 
liberation project might look like the day after decolonisation, for instance, tactics centred 
around BDS elicit a vision which avoids simply mirroring failed nationalist state structures 
that are hierarchical, exclusionary and patriarchal, and imagines instead the possibility of a 
mode of popular sovereignty that is more open, horizontal and inclusive.
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In a piece on the engagement of international legal scholars with Palestine, Jean d’as-
premont characterises the partisan deployment of international law in pursuit of justice as 
the intellectual equivalent to hurling stones at an illicit occupying force.98 Edward Said of 
course famously did physically hurl a stone at the edifice of an illicit occupying force. and 
through this powerfully symbolic act he reminds us of the importance of remaining militant 
in the pursuit of our political projects, if not in our conviction in the law itself as an end. The 
challenges before TWaIlers and anti-colonial lawyers as amateur or partisan intellectuals, 
then, involve engaging the law tactically where appropriate, moving beyond the landscape 
of law where necessary, and exposing the suffocating tendencies of blinkered professional 
thinking always.
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